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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. There was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Standley violated 
the special term of probation that he not quit the Suboxone treatment or the 
general term of probation that he meaningfully participate in his Suboxone 
treatment program. 
1. Mr. Standley did not violate Special Condition of Probation (e) 
The state asserts there was sufficient evidence to show Mr. Standley violated 
Special Condition of Probation (e)1 because he "quit the Suboxone program when he 
took it upon himself to stop taking the Suboxone." State's Brief, pg. 4. However, 
Mr. Standley did not stop taking the Suboxone. He had 34 extra strips out of the 
approximately 600 strips he was prescribed during the ten months he was in the 
program. T pg. 73, ln. 24-25. Thus, it appears that Mr. Standley took 566 of the 
600 strips, i.e., 94.3% of the total. While he was taking less than the recommended 
dose, it cannot be said that he had stopped taking Suboxone. "To stop," it seems 
almost too obvious to note, means to "discontinue."2 It does not mean to "slightly 
decrease" or to "be compliant nearly 100% of the time." Thus, the state's assertion 
that Mr. Standley stopped taking the Suboxone grossly overstates the facts. 
Nor can it be said that Mr. Standley "quit" the program, in violation of 
Special Condition (e) by missing 5.4% of the Suboxone doses. It is worth noting 
1 That special condition provided: "The defendant shall complete the 
Suboxone program that he is currently enrolled in through Dr. David R. Hadlock's 
office. If the defendant quits the program prior to the completion date as 
recommended by Dr. Hadlock, such conduct shall constitute a probation violation." 
2 www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stop 
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there were no ill effects of the missed doses, as Mr. Standley's UAs were all clean 
and he was otherwise fully engaged in Dr. Hadlock's treatment program. 
Finally, even if Mr. Standley had truly stopped taking the Suboxone, it still 
wouldn't mean that he had "quit" the program. "To quit," means "to stop doing (an 
action or activity)"3 To the contrary, Dr. Hadlock testified that Mr. Standley was 
still in the program and that special arrangements had been made for him since he 
was in jail. T pg. 90, ln. 23-25. The doctor also noted that, in addition to the clean 
twice weekly urine tests, Mr. Standley was attending IOP aftercare, relapse 
prevention, and community support meetings. T pg. 100, ln. 12-19. 
The state seeks to avoid the meaning of the word "quit" by pointing to Dr. 
Hadlock's treatment agreement, wherein Mr. Standley promised Dr. Hadlock that 
he would "totally comply with all aspects and conditions of this agreement contract." 
Exhibits pg. 42 (underlining and bold omitted). But again, not being fully in 
compliance with the agreement does not mean Mr. Standley quit the program in 
violation of Special Condition (e). That special condition doesn't require total 
compliance with the treatment program. It just requires that Mr. Standley not quit 
the program and eventually complete it. 
Dr. Hadlock wouldn't even say that Mr. Standley was noncompliant with the 
program. He explained that the treatment agreement is "not a legal document," 
that it is not unusual for patients to be noncompliant and that he gives his patients 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quit 
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"some latitude" when they violate the strict terms of the agreement. T pg. 88, ln. 
19-20; pg. 89, ln. 4-11. 
In short, the state's argument that Mr. Standley violated Special Condition 
(e) because he quit the program is totally disproved by the record. 
2. The court did not find Mr. Standley violated General Condition #15, nor 
does the record support such a finding. 
As predicted, the state could not resist arguing that Mr. Standley violated 
General Condition of Probation #15, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court 
did not make a finding that he had. See, T pg. 113, ln. 11 - pg. 114, ln. 3. Of course, 
since the court did not find he violated General Condition #15, that could not have 
been part of the reason it revoked probation and imposed the sentence. Thus, the 
state's argument that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding the court 
didn't make and didn't rely upon in its decision doesn't make any difference here. 
What's more, it's wrong. 
General Condition of Probation #15 requires, in relevant part, that "[t]he 
Defendant shall meaningfully participate in and successfully complete any 
treatment, counseling or other programs deemed beneficial to the Defendant and as 
directed by the Court or any agent of the IDOC." R 17 4. As noted above, Dr. 
Hadlock testified that Mr. Standley had "participated fully in all components of the 
program" and was making "phenomenal" progress. T pg. 82, ln. 21-22. The doctor 
also testified that is not uncommon for patients to forget to take all their Suboxone, 
that missing a dose is not necessarily a problem, and perfect compliance with the 
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treatment agreement is not expected. T pg. 88, ln. 19-20; pg. 89, ln. 4-11. Mr. 
Standley had completed most of the educational components of the program, but 
was still attending community support meetings and actually leading some of the 
meetings. T pg. 100, ln. 12-19. Finally, there was no indication that Mr. Standley 
was using illegal drugs and the court found there was no evidence that he was 
selling controlled substances. T pg. 178, ln. 22 - pg 179, ln. 2. 4 
The state emphasizes the court's comment that "Mr. Standley has not 
followed that program like he was directed." State's Brief, pg. 5, citing T pg. 113, ln. 
14-15. But it ignores that Mr. Standley's conditions of probation did not require 
him to "follow the program like he was directed." Special condition (e) only required 
him to not "quit" the program and someday complete it. General Condition # 15 
only required that he "meaningfully particulate in the program." 
There is no evidence in the record to suggest he didn't meaningfully 
participate in Dr. Hadlock's program, nor did the court make such a finding. Even 
if Mr. Standley did not participate in the treatment program 100% as "directed," his 
94.3% compliance rate with the Suboxone, along with his clean UAs and his 
completion of most of the education components of the treatment prove that he 
meaningfully participated in treatment as required by General Condition #15. The 
state's argument to the contrary is meritless. 
4 The court stated: "I don't have any evidence before me today that Mr. 
Standley's still in the drug business. I don't know that. In fact, I'd have to say 
there is no evidence of that. I have no evidence that he's continued to use while he 
was out of jail. And that certainly is to his credit." 
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B. The district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and 
imposing sentence. 
Defense counsel conceded and the court found that Mr. Standley had 
prohibited contact with Ms. Schriener. It did not find, however, that he had 
prohibited contact with Mr. Lewis. T pg. 157, ln. 19 - pg. 159, ln. 20. 
Since the court found a knowing and intentional probation violation, this 
Court reviews the decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 
20-222; State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138, 772 P.2d 1231, 1232 (Ct. App.1989). 
In this case, an independent review of the record shows the court abused its 
discretion because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards nor 
did it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 
325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The state does not specifically argue in support of the court. Instead, it 
merely "submits that Standley has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for 
reasons more fully set out in the attached excerpt of the disposition hearing 
transcript." State's Brief, pg. 8. In fact, however, that record shows that the court 
abused its discretion in revoking probation and executing the sentence. Mr. 
Standley set out those reasons in his Opening Brief, pg. 15-16. 
Suffice it to say here that the court did not act consistently with the 
applicable legal standards because it disregarded both Mr. Standley's rehabilitation 
and the protection of society when it revoked probation, especially in light of its 
findings that Ms. Standley was neither using nor selling drugs. Moreover, the 
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court's belief that Mr. Standley "was trying to manipulate someone in the drug 
court system," T pg. 180, ln. 15-19, was not supported by the record. If anything, 
the record shows Ms. Schreiner's goal was to manipulate Mr. Standley into giving 
her drugs when she initiated the text message exchange. 
Second, the court's decisions were not made by the exercise of reason. The 
imposition of a life sentence with fifteen years fixed is a very serious matter, 
especially so when the state only recommended a twelve-year maximum sentence 
and conceded that a life sentence was not appropriate. T pg. 40, ln. 4-23. It was not 
a rational decision to impose such a unduly harsh sentence due to the text messages 
or even the ten minute conversation with a drug user. The manifest 
inappropriateness of such a sentence makes one wonder if the court wasn't telling 
Mr. Standley the absolute, unvarnished truth when it told him, "I set you up to 
fail." T pg. 178, In. 22 - pg. 179, In. 13. T pg. 180, ln. 6. If it did, it would be an 
abuse of discretion to impose the life sentence neither party sought. 
But even if the court didn't intend Mr. Standley to fail, it was still an abuse of 
discretion to impose the life sentence especially since the court did so in part 
because of the mistaken finding that Mr. Standley was guilty of Count II by 
violating Special Condition (e). (As noted above, the court did not find that Mr. 
Standley violated General Condition #15.) There was not sufficient evidence to 
support that finding. It is certainly possible that the court would not have imposed 
the original sentence had it not found a violation of Count II. Even if this Court 
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gives full credit to the court's statement about one violation"'"and you're gone," the 
court did not say it would unvariably impose the life sentence and it might have 
exercised its discretion and reduced the sentence to the state's original 
recommendation of fourteen years with four fixed. See ICR 35(b). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Wesly Standley asks this Court to vacate the 
order revoking his probation and imposing the sentence without reduction, and 
remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this32~y of November, 2015. 
b~~~~ 
Dennis Benjamin J 
Attorney for Wesly Standley 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this~ay of November, 2015, caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing document to be placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Lori A. Fleming 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Dennis Benj arnin 
8 
